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In the United States, violence against indigenous women is unprecedented.1  According to 
the Indian Law Resource Center, greater than 80% of indigenous women have experienced 
violence of some kind, while greater than 50% of women have experienced sexual violence.2  The 
reported rates against indigenous women are at least ten times higher than the rest of the United 
States.3  Most of these women never see their abusers brought to justice.4  
For nearly 35 years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Tribe, which held that tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even if the 
crime occurs on tribal land, the United States upheld a jurisdictional scheme which stripped tribal 
courts of criminal authority over non-Indians, and thereby precluded tribal courts from 
participating in the hearing and resolution of disputes regarding violence against indigenous 
women.5  In fact, until the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was reauthorized in 2013, tribal 
courts could not prosecute non-Indian perpetrators for any crime committed on tribal land.6  At 
last, VAWA 2013 took one step in restoring criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts by providing the 
courts with Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ).7  Upon passage of VAWA 
2013, one survivor of abuse, Lisa Brunner, stated: 
 
We have always known non-Indians can come onto our lands and 
they can beat, rape and murder us and there is nothing we can do 
about it.... Now, our tribal officers have jurisdiction for the first time 
to do something about certain crimes. But it is just the first sliver of 
the full moon that we need to protect us.8   
 
As of 2018, five years following the reauthorization of VAWA with the provisions of the 
SDVCJ, at least eighteen tribes have opted-in the special jurisdiction, leading to 143 arrests of 128 
 
1 Throughout this Article, various terms referring to the indigenous population in the United States are used.  For 
example, the terms “indigenous,” “Native American,” and “Indian” should be understood to be used 
interchangeably.  Similarly, the terms “Indian Country” and “First Nations” should be understood to be 
interchangeable.  While the federal government uses the terms “Indian” and “Indian Country,” the author 
appreciates and understands that “indigenous” and “First Nations” may be more preferred by some members of 
these populations. 
2 Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/ending-
violence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/FL4F-LXK7] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
6 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Reauthorization 2013, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/violence-against-women-act-vawa-reauthorization-2013-0 [https://perma.cc/9ABJ-
Z5GA] (last updated Mar. 26, 2015). 
7 Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, 
http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/sdvcj-overview [https://perma.cc/V9SU-RHN8] (last updated June 2019). 
8 VAWA 2013’s Special Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction Five-Year Report, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN 




non-Indian abusers.9  Of these arrests, seventy-four led to convictions, four to acquittals, while the 
remaining were pending as of publishing of the five-year report.10  While implementation of 
SDVCJ has been overwhelmingly positive, it has also revealed areas where further resources and 
assistance are needed.  Of particular note, the breadth of SDVCJ is limited – as evidenced by its 
name – to incidents of domestic violence or dating violence between romantic or intimate partners, 
only.11 
In particular, SDVCJ fails to include provisions protecting the children involved in 58% of 
all criminal domestic violence incidents.12  Further still, VAWA 2013 fails to allow tribal courts 
to charge non-Indians for crimes including, but not limited to, assault of law enforcement, stalking, 
sexual contact (absent a domestic or dating relationship), endangering the welfare of a minor, false 
imprisonment, violence against a victim’s family, and drug possession.13  Not only does SDVCJ 
lack jurisdictional breadth, but for some tribes, the implementation of the jurisdiction is 
prohibitively expensive, making it difficult to provide the resources necessary for effective 
implementation.14  In particular, in order to implement or opt-in to SDVCJ, a tribe must meet the 
statutory requirements set out in VAWA, which include for example, guaranteeing all rights under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); ensuring all judges presiding over SDVCJ cases have the 
necessary training; making all criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure 
publicly available; and, providing indigent defendants with effective assistance of counsel.15  
Satisfying these statutory requirements often requires that interested tribes revise existing tribal 
codes, policies, procedures, and sometimes even constitutions – a process that is not only lengthy, 
but also costly for the tribes.16      
On April 4, 2019, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1585, the bill 
setting forth the fourth reauthorization of VAWA, which, if enacted, would expand tribal 
jurisdiction further to include sexual violence, sex trafficking, stalking, criminal child abuse, and 
violence against tribal law enforcement.17  As federal legislators have tended to unraveling the 
jurisdictional maze that has plagued the indigenous population for decades, the members of the 




11 Joshua B. Gurney, An “SDVCJ Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 70 HASTINGS L. J. 887, 
899-900 (2019).  
12 See supra note 8. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 VAWA 2013’s Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ), NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/overview/VAWA_Information_-
_Technical_Assistance_Resources_Guide_Updated_November_11_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8DG-5NQZ] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
16 Id. 
17 Lacina Tangnaqado Onco, Victory: The Violence Against Women Act Passes House with Tribal Provisions, 
FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.fcnl.org/updates/victory-the-violence-
against-women-act-passes-house-with-tribal-provisions-2036 [https://perma.cc/Z7BM-S4CJ]. 
18 Melodie Edwards, 7 States Step Up Efforts to Fight Violence Against Indigenous Women, NATIONAL PUBLIC 
RADIO (July 23, 2019, 5:01 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/23/743659569/7-states-step-up-efforts-to-fight-
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tribes have lacked access to federal and state databases to track and locate victims of crimes.  Of 
5,712 cases of missing and murdered indigenous women reported in 2016, only 116 were entered 
in a Department of Justice database.19  Responding to these dire statistics, seven states – Wyoming, 
New Mexico, Montana, Minnesota, Arizona, California, and Nebraska – have adopted task forces 
in an effort to take early steps in identifying and locating indigenous victims of crimes.20   
However, neither VAWA 2019 or tribal tasks forces can fully rectify the damage left in the 
wake of Oliphant, even considering the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, rendered on July 9, 2020, which upheld that states do not have criminal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by Indians on Indian land.21  Specifically, VAWA 2019 still fails to 
recognize the inherent power and sovereignty of tribal courts, a right which the United States has 
ostensibly recognized since the colonization of this country, but which has been continuously 
stripped over nearly two centuries of judicial and legislative actions.  Until tribal criminal 
jurisdiction is returned to tribal courts indigenous women will continue to be entrapped within a 
complex jurisdictional scheme that makes it difficult – if not impossible – to receive justice for the 
harms committed against them. 
This Article is divided into three Parts.  Part I will provide a contextual jurisdictional 
history of how the prosecution of crimes against indigenous people have been shaped and 
continuously limited by judicial and legislative action.  Part I concludes with the introduction of 
VAWA 2013, and the proposed VAWA 2019 revisions, introduced by Congress to help restore 
some semblance of authority to the tribal courts.  Part II will critically evaluate the role of the 
federal government, that is, the legislature and judiciary alike, in the historical stripping of tribal 
sovereignty, and will shed light on the role that bias has played in the creation and development 
of Indian law doctrine.  Part II will argue for the abrogation of Oliphant and restoring criminal 
jurisdiction to tribal courts as a means of abolishing the systemic bias present in Indian law.  Part 
III will analyze the impacts such an action would entail through the lens of indigenous women, 
including any impacts that would be felt by non-Indian defendants.  Part III will further consider 
the benefits and difficulties tribal courts will face in assuming jurisdiction over all defendants, 
regardless of race or tribal affiliation, and will ask whether the institutional bias against indigenous 
people and the first nations can ever truly be eliminated.  Finally, Part III will consider whether 






19 Chris Aadland, ‘A really good first step’: Task force could help state understand missing and murdered 
Indigenous people problem, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE (July 22, 2019), https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/a-
really-good-first-step-task-force-could-help-state/article_390a28f0-b05e-5648-b960-c46fde40abea.html 
[https://perma.cc/3Z9D-BASA]. 
20 Edwards, supra note 18. 
21 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (holding that the State of Oklahoma did not have the jurisdiction to 
prosecute McGirt, who was charged with several sexual offenses.  The Court abided by its prior precedent, 





As of November 2018, the Native American population in the United States was estimated 
to be about 6.8 million – or about 2.03% of the entire population.22  Among Native American 
women, over 80% have experienced violence, and more than 50% have experienced sexual 
violence.23  On some reservations, the murder rate of indigenous women is more than ten times 
higher than the national average.24  Yet, due to an “unworkable, race-based criminal jurisdictional 
scheme” shaped and crafted by the United States federal government over the past several decades 
– perpetuating ideologies and biases dating back to the colonization of this country – the majority 
of these women never see their abusers brought to justice.25  Not only can tribal courts not exercise 
jurisdiction over many of these abusers, as described in more detail in this Article, but the federal 
government itself frequently declines to prosecute these cases, often citing to “weak or insufficient 
evidence,” “no federal offense evident” or “witness problems.”26  In fact, between the years 2005 
and 2009, the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute about 52% (or about 4,000 cases) of 









22 American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2018, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 25, 
2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2018/cb18ff09-aian.pdf (inclusive 
of those who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native, either alone or in combination with one or more other 
races). 
23 Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Single Year of Age, Race Alone or in Combination, and 
Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last updated June 2019); 
Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/ending-
violence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/RX9C-JVS8] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
24 Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/ending-
violence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/RX9C-JVS8] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
25 Id.  By a “race-based” jurisdictional scheme, it is meant that the race of each of the perpetrator and the victim (i.e., 
Indian or non-Indian) will dictate which of the tribe, the state, and/or the federal government has jurisdiction to 
prosecute the crime.  In Indian law, being “Indian” typically refers to a political identity, as opposed to a racial 
identity.  For example, in Morton v. Manaciari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court noted that the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs did not discriminate against non-Indian employees by implementing hiring preferences for Indian 
employees.  The Court noted that the preference was “granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as 
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.”  
The technical distinction between viewing Indian-status as a racial identity versus a political identity contributes to 
the unworkable schemes within Indian Law, particularly within the context of criminal jurisdiction. 
26 David C. Maurer, U.S. Department of Justice Declinations of Indian Country Criminal Matters (Dec. 13, 2010), 
available at https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11167r.pdf at p. 3. 
27 Id.  The term “violent” does not have any specific criteria.  A crime is considered to be “violent” or “nonviolent” 
at the discretion of the prosecutor and may vary among districts. 
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A. A Historical Framework: The Origins and Creation of the Jurisdictional Maze 
 
In order to understand the contemporary relationship between Indian Country28 and the federal 
government, we must first consider the complex and nuanced foundations upon which tribal 
sovereignty within the federal government has been built.  In particular, we must understand how 
Indian reservations came to be under the idea of a “measured separatism,” which guaranteed 
sovereignty to the indigenous people as the result of negotiated treaties and settlements between 
the tribes and the federal government.29 
 
1. A History of Tribal-Federal Relations: The Rise and Fall of a “Measured Separatism” 
 
Upon the colonization of what is now the United States of America, European settlers and 
early legislators guaranteed to the indigenous people certain rights as the result of negotiated 
treaties.30  These treaties gave rise to the “measured separatism” between the tribes and the federal 
government, which insulates the tribes from encroachment, but also ultimately subjects the tribes 
to the power of the United States.31  In many ways, the colonization of Indian Country has 
continued into more modern history, via both legislative and judicial action.32  However, at the 
outset, from about 1774 until about 1832, the federal government negotiated treaties with Native 
Americans under the notion of a “bargained-for” exchange in which the Indian tribes agreed to 
make peace and relinquish land, while the federal government agreed to extend certain services to 
Indian Country, such as funding and protection.33  Despite the power imbalance between the tribes 
and the federal government in reaching many of these agreements, the treaties were intended to 
recognize Indian land as free from the “incursion of both the state and non-Indian settlers.”34  In 
effect, these treaties were made to recognize the inherent rights of the indigenous as a sovereign 
people, rights that were passed down to them from their ancestors, who had their own inherent 
rights that required no validation from the European colonizers.35   
 
28 As provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the term “Indian Country” means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of 
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 




32 See generally Jessica Allison, Beyond VAWA: Protecting Native American from Sexual Violence Within Existing 
Tribal Jurisdictional Structures 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (2019).  
33 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17; see also American Indian Treaties, NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/treaties [https://perma.cc/UPH7-VF6T] (last reviewed Oct. 4, 
2016). 
34 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17. 
35 Native American Rights, https://law.jrank.org/pages/8754/Native-American-Rights.html [https://perma.cc/YW7H-
XPPL] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
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As a result of these treaties, Native Americans occupy a unique legal position in the United 
States – even today.   While they are citizens of the United States and can enjoy the benefits 
associated with that status, they are also concurrently members of a self-governing tribe, whose 
law and order predate the arrival or encroachment of any colonizer.36  It is important to recognize, 
however, that these initial treaties, which essentially established the Indian reservations as we 
understand them to exist today, were fueled by a cultural and racial bias that viewed the First 
Nations as inherently inferior.  This bias was, and continues to be, interwoven throughout the 
tribal-federal relationship.  The belief that “non-Indians could not live harmoniously with Indians,” 
espoused by the federal government resulted in separate allocations of land for the Indian people.37 
 
a. The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790, 1799, and 1802 
 
The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790, 1799, and 1802 were among the first federal 
actions to create a jurisdictional buffer between Indians and non-Indians.38  Through these Acts, 
Congress took control over all Indian affairs, pursuant to its rights to regulate commerce with 
Indian tribes in Article one, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.  In recognizing and 
realizing the provisions of these Acts, the government maintained control over any contact 
between Indians and non-Indians.39  For example, neither non-Indians nor the states could purchase 
land from individual Indians or tribes without the approval of the federal government.40  The 
federal government also exerted control over the regulation of trade among Indians, including the 
prohibition of the sale of alcohol.41  In fact, non-Indian settlers were required to have a passport to 
even cross the sovereign Indian lands.42  Furthermore, and significant to the analysis of this Article, 
the federal government maintained criminal jurisdiction in these reservations, ceding some of it to 
the states.43  Through the Trade and Intercourse Acts, Congress provided that a state could punish 










40 See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse With the Indian Tribes (1790), 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, https://pages.uoregon.edu/mjdennis/courses/hist469_trade.htm [https://perma.cc/8QAP-
XSGQ] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (providing full text of the original act). 
41 Id. 
42 American Indian Treaties, supra note 33. 
43 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17. 
44 Jurisdiction: Bringing Clarity out of Chaos, in A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER, 
https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/Chapter_1_Jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6A-ADHY]; see also 1 
Stat. § 137 (1790); 1 Stat. § 743 (1799); 2 Stat. § 139 (1802).  While the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 provided 
a state could punish crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians under the laws of the state, the General 
Crimes Act of 1817 later modified the states jurisdiction in such cases.  See infra, note 64. 
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b. The Marshall Trilogy 
 
In a series of Supreme Court decisions, referred to as the “Marshall Trilogy,” the Court 
acknowledged the inherent powers of the tribes.45  These cases – Johnson v. M’Intosh; Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia; and Worcester v. Georgia – each authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, 
established federal primacy in Indian affairs46, excluded the states from invoking their laws in 
Indian Country47, and acknowledged the inherent power of the tribes to self-govern.48  Specifically, 
in Johnson, the Court affirmed federal authority over Indian affairs, which barred all land and 
commercial transactions with Indians absent consent from the United States government, pursuant 
to the Trade and Intercourse Acts.49   
In Cherokee Nation, the Court had to determine whether a state could impose its laws on 
Native Americans in response to Georgia’s attempt to force the Cherokee people off of the state’s 
land.50  Rather than applying a substantive analysis on the factual issue, a deeply split Marshall 
Court51 concluded that because Cherokee Nation did not qualify as a “foreign state,” but rather as 
a “domestic dependent nation,” the Court lacked jurisdiction over the tribe.52  In his majority 
opinion, Marshall wrote of the Cherokee: 
 
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness 
and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
President as their Great Father. They and their country are 
considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so 
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States 
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political 
connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of 
our territory and an act of hostility.53 
 
The Cherokee Nation decision effectively established that Indian Country was not susceptible or 
bound by the laws of the states in which these “domestic dependent nations” resided.54 
 
45 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 
1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_ rights_magazine _home /2014_vol_40/vol--
40--no--1--tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_ indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/44XJ-GAN9]. 
46 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
47 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
48 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Fletcher, supra note 45. 
49 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543; see also infra note 80. 
50 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1. 
51 Only Marshall and one other Justice, J. Gabriel Duvall, signed onto the majority opinion.  Each of Justices 
William Johnson and Henry Baldwin concurred in the outcome, but wrote individual opinions against Indian 
interests.  Justice Smith Thompson wrote the dissenting opinion, which Justice Joseph Story joined. 
52 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.  The issue involved a claim under Article III of the Constitution, which provides 
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over claims between a State of the citizens thereof, and foreign states, 
citizens, or subject. 
53 Id. at 17-18. 
54 See id. 
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The last case of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, is credited for building the 
foundations of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.55  In Worcester, the plaintiff, a missionary living 
with the Cherokee who helped establish the Cherokee Phoenix,56 worked with the Cherokee Nation 
to utilize the courts to push back against the westward expansion of the states.  The state of Georgia 
had passed a law prohibiting all white men, such as Worcester, from living on Native American 
land without a license.57  While the law was intended to prevent white men from encroachment on 
Indian territory, Worcester, joined by eleven other missionaries and supported by the Cherokee, 
published a resolution against the law reasoning that the law effectively forced the Cherokee 
Nation into relinquishing its inherent sovereignty to govern its own land.58  When the law took 
effect, Worcester and the eleven other men were arrested and convicted.59  Worcester appealed to 
the Supreme Court.60  In ruling in favor of Worcester, the Court held that state laws have “no 
force” in Indian Country and that only the federal government had the authority to deal with Indian 
nations.61  In the last case of this trilogy, Marshall wrote: 
 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the 
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia 
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of 
congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of 
the United States.62 
 
Thus, the Court made absolutely clear that the laws of the states have no impact on Indian 
Country.63 
   
c. General Crimes Act to Crow Dog, and Congress’s Response 
 
While Justice John Marshall penned opinions still referenced today by advocates of 
indigenous rights, Congress drafted laws to expand federal control over the tribes of Indian 
 
55 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy 82 N.D. L. REV. 627 (2006). 
56 The first Native American newspaper. 
57 In accordance with the provisions of the Trade and Intercourse Acts. 
58 Richard Mize, Worcester, Samuel Austin (1778-1859), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLAHOMA HISTORY AND 
CULTURE, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=WO020 [https://perma.cc/B2TN-N56D] 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 




61 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
62 Id. at 561. 
63 Id.  Significantly, however, President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the Court’s decision, resulting in the 
forceful removal of Cherokee Nation from Georgia via the Trail of Tears. See Trail of Tears, HISTORY (Nov. 9, 
2009), https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/A5RJ-65JR]. 
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Country.  In 1817, the Second Congress of the United States passed the General Crimes Act which 
extended federal criminal jurisdiction to cover some crimes committed by Indians against non-
Indians (e.g., federal crimes of general applicability such as assault of a federal officer), as well as 
all crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian Country.64  Notably, the Act did not 
grant federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against Indians, which remained in the 
purview of tribal law and custom.65   
This measured separatism, at least as it applied to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over its 
own people against its own people, came to a screeching halt by 1885, however, when Congress 
passed the Major Crimes Act in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.66  
In Crow Dog, an Indian man, known as Crow Dog, shot and killed another Indian man, Spotted 
Tail, on Indian land.67 Crow Dog petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing 
that the crime with which he was charged and convicted was not illegal under the laws of the 
United States, and that the district court had no jurisdiction to try him under the provisions of the 
General Crimes Act, which reserved crimes by Indians against Indians to the tribes.68  The district 
court had found that the murder of Spotted Tail was a crime of general applicability (i.e., that it 
violated the general federal statute against murder, which was extended to Indian Country by the 
General Crimes Act) and therefore claimed jurisdiction.69  The Supreme Court granted the writ of 
habeas corpus, holding that there was no federal jurisdiction over the crimes committed by Indians 
against Indians, in accordance with the provisions of the General Crimes Act.70  In its opinion, the 
Supreme Court left no doubt of its conviction that the tribe should be exclusively responsible for 
handling such matters: 
 
It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that 
law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the 
members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the 
instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power 
which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and 
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil 
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have 
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by 
others, and not for them, which . . . makes no allowance for their 
inability to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the 
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors 
of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which 
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the 
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest 
 
64 18 U.S.C. § 1152; WILLIAM CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 148-49 (4th ed. 2004). 
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prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man's 
revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.71 
 
 Reacting to the Supreme Court’s defense of tribal jurisdiction of crimes by Indians against 
Indians, Congress promptly passed the Major Crimes Act, thereby expanding federal jurisdiction 
over seven – later amended to sixteen – distinct crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country, 
regardless of the race of the victim.72  These crimes include, in part, murder, manslaughter, rape, 
kidnapping, incest, felony child abuse or neglect, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and 
robbery.73   
The constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act did not go unchallenged, and was first tested 
in United States v. Kagama.  In Kagama, the defendant and his son, Mahawaha, were charged in 
the murder of their neighbor, Iyousa, with whom the defendant had recurring property disputes.74  
The murder occurred on the Indian reservation.75  Despite the local district attorney’s decision not 
to prosecute, consistent with the practice of not intervening in crimes between Indians, the U.S. 
Attorney for Northern California forcefully prosecuted the case under the authority of the Major 
Crimes Act.76  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Major Crimes Act.77  The 
Court justified that this expansion of federal jurisdiction over Indians was constitutional due to the 
dependent status of the tribes as wards of the federal government.78  In so holding, the Major 
Crimes Act became the first systemic intrusion of the federal government into the internal affairs 
of the tribes.79  The measured separatism had crumbled. 
Following Kagama and the Major Crimes Act, the level of control of Congress over Indian 
life continued to evolve.  In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Supreme Court 
coined the unilateral control of Congress over tribes as its “plenary authority,” (i.e., plenary power) 
which had been “exercised by Congress from the beginning, and [had] always been deemed a 
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”  The 
decision, rooted in paternalism and bias, viewed the tribes as “weak,” “helpless,” and wholly 
dependent on the federal government.  From this dependence, said the Court, arose the “duty of 
protection,” and therefore Congress’s power to unilaterally limit, modify, or eliminate any rights 
possessed by the tribes.80  The plenary power doctrine, which has continued to expand over time, 
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was a stark deviation from the principles of inherent tribal authority espoused in the Marshall 
Trilogy.  While “there is no acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for 
the exercise of any federal authority over Indian Tribes without their consent manifested through 
treaty,” the Supreme Court introduced this new doctrine that has manifested in Congress the 
authority to create binding legislation without tribal consent.81 
 
2. Major Crimes Act to Oliphant: Involuntary Assimilation and the Continuing Assault 
on Tribal Sovereignty 
 
Following the Major Crimes Act, a series of federal acts continued to undermine and 
destroy the traditional tribal culture and institution.  In particular, the General Allotment Act of 
1887, also known as the Dawes Act, created individual parcels of Indian land held in trust by the 
federal government.82  Passed under the administration of President Grover Cleveland, the Act was 
motivated by the federal government’s interest in assimilating the First Nations and encouraging 
them to undertake farming and agriculture.83  To do so, tribal land needed to be broken up into 
individual plots.84  The Dawes Act was described by President Theodore Roosevelt as “a mighty 
pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass.  It acts directly upon the family and the 
individual.”85  The Dawes Severalty Act authorized the government, via the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, to hold 160 acres of tribal land in trust for a period of twenty-five years for each head of 
household.86  At the end of the twenty-five years, individuals who took up residence on the 
allotment of land, away from their tribes, were granted United States citizenship.87  In 1906, 
however, before the twenty-five year trust had expired, allotments of land were authorized for fee 
transfer to Indians deemed to be “competent” under the Burke Act, which amended the Dawes 
Act.88  Competency was determined, in part, by whether the individual was one-half degree Indian 
blood or less.89  According to the Burke Act, any Indian who took up residence away from the 
tribe and “adopted the habits of civilized life” was declared a citizen and received with that status 
all of its immunities and privileges.90  As a result of the Dawes and Burke Acts, each rooted in the 
presumed inferiority of indigenous people, their humanity, and their culture, tribal land was 
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reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934.91  Moreover, the reservations 
became “checkerboards” of tribal, individual Indian, individual non-Indian, and corporate land.92 
 While the Indian population continued to undergo an involuntary assimilation in their day-
to-day lives due to the loss of their land, the convoluted interactions between the federal, state, and 
tribal courts became even more muddled.  In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 without 
consent from the tribes.93  Public Law 280 mandated the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal 
government to state governments in six states – California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, 
Washington, and Alaska94 – granting these states both civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribal 
lands within their borders.95  While Public Law 280 increased the role of states in moderating and 
prosecuting criminal activity on Indian land, it allocated no federal funding for the states and it 
resulted in confusion for law enforcement agencies and courts, to the detriment of tribes.96  
Moreover, Public Law 280 was passed in spite of ample Indian testimony that was overwhelmingly 
in opposition to the law.97  The law, purporting to “free” tribes from federal supervision, was in 
effect an attempt to terminate tribes by assimilation.98  Indeed, the land of many small tribes was 
sold to the highest bidder, effectively ending tribal sovereignty and forcing tribes to rely on the 
states for education, land use, and other economic and social services..99  As Congress only 
mandated this transfer of power in six states, Public Law 280 failed to provide uniform guidance 
for the tribal courts and Native Americans in states where passage was merely optional,  thereby 
adding to the complexity of the already convoluted jurisdictional scheme.100   
In 1978, the assault on sovereign tribal criminal jurisdiction continued and intensified.  In 
a split and landmark decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court further 
stripped tribal courts of jurisdiction over their lands and people.101  The Court held that tribal courts 
lack any jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for crimes committed on Indian land.102  In 
Oliphant, the plaintiff, who was petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, was a non-Indian living 
as a permanent resident with the Suquamish tribe on Port Madison Indian Reservation in northwest 
Washington.103  In August 1973, Oliphant was arrested and charged by tribal police with assaulting 
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a tribal officer and resisting arrest during an annual celebration, called Chief Seattle Days.104  
Oliphant’s petitions for the writ of habeas corpus were denied by the lower courts.105  In particular, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over Oliphant, a non-Indian who committed a 
crime on Indian land as an important part of its tribal sovereignty.106  “Surely the power to preserve 
order on the reservation, when necessary by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua 
non [i.e., an essential condition] of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed,” stated 
the court.107 
 However, the Supreme Court disagreed in a controversial split decision.108  In its majority 
opinion, the Court cited an “unspoken assumption” of Congress that tribal criminal jurisdiction 
did not extend to non-Indians, and argued that tribes “must depend on the Federal Government for 
protection from intruders.”109  In so holding, the Court analogized to Crow Dog, asserting that, just 
as the Court in Crow Dog found it would be unfair to subject Indians to an “unknown code” 
imposed by people of a different “race [and] tradition” from their own, it would be just as unfair 
to subject Oliphant, a non-Indian to the codes of the tribe.110  Although separated from the 
expressly racist language of the Court in Crow Dog by ninety-five years, the Court’s parallel 
analysis in Oliphant demonstrates the pervasiveness of the bias against the First Nations within 
the most powerful institutions of the United States.  In a decision that reflected the Court’s bias, it 
was decided that exclusive tribal jurisdiction over crimes not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act 
was narrowly limited to crimes by Indian offenders against Indian victims, only.111  The tribes’ 
inherent authority to regulate and govern its own land and people – in accordance with their early 
treaties with the federal government – had been disrespected and ignored.   
By 1990, the lack of jurisdiction over crimes not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act was 
temporarily rendered more exclusive by the Supreme Court.112  In Duro v. Reina, the Court 
concluded that tribal courts had no jurisdiction over the crimes of nonmember Indians.113  As a 
result of this decision, a “jurisdictional void” was created, where for certain crimes, none of the 
federal, state, and tribal governments had the power to prosecute nonmember Indian offenders.114  
Thus, Congress quickly amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to incorporate the power of the tribal 
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amendment, known as the “Duro-fix,” has since been upheld by the Supreme Court, therefore 
overturning the decision of Duro.116 
Thus, by the end of the 20th century, the “inherent power” and sovereignty granted to the 
Native Americans via the mutually agreed upon treaties with the European colonizers had fractured 
into an unworkable and prejudiced scheme which failed to prioritize any interests of First Nations. 
 
3. McGirt v. Oklahoma: A Glimmer of Hope 
 
On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court rendered its long-awaited decision in McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, a dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the state of Oklahoma over its indigenous 
population.117  In its 5-4 holding, the Court honored the 19th century treaties made between the 
federal government and the First Nations, although it also upheld the plenary power doctrine by 
recognizing that the inherent authority of the tribes can only be disestablished through a “clear 
expression of congressional intent.”118  Here, petitioner Jimmy McGirt, a member of the Seminole 
Nation whose crimes were committed on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, asserted that 
the state had no jurisdiction to prosecute him under the laws of the state, and that he must be 
granted a new trial in federal court based on the provisions of the Major Crimes Act (MCA).119  
Specifically, his appeal turned on whether his crimes were committed on the land of “Indian 
Country,” thereby granting jurisdiction to the federal government and the tribe, or if, as Oklahoma 
argued, they occurred on state land.120   
Holding that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation, the majority stated that the 
Creek Nation was promised a reservation in perpetuity.121  Noting the previous restrictions and 
expansions Congress had made on tribal authority, Justice Gorsuch wrote, “As a result, many of 
the arguments before us today follow a sadly familiar pattern.  Yes, promises were made, but the 
price of keeping them has become too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye.  We reject 
that thinking.”122  Absent express withdrawal of the promised reservations from the First Nation 
by Congress, the Court upheld the jurisdictional scheme subjected to the First Nations under the 
MCA.123  Although this holding does little to demystify the jurisdictional maze, or to restore full 
tribal authority to the First Nations themselves, the passionate opinion from the Court reinvigorates 
and initiates a new momentum in the fight for elimination of the institutional bias against the First 
Nations built into the present-day framework of the country.  Indeed, while the decision in McGirt 
has little, if any, impact on the day-to-day lives of non-Indian citizens living on Indian territory, 
as noted by two indigenous female scholars, it does “preserve the right of the Muscogee Nation’s 
Lighthorse Police [i.e., Muscogee Nation’s law enforcement] to protect the lives of Native women 
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living within the Muscogee Nation’s borders.”124  Moreover, although this decision did not 
ultimately render McGirt accountable for his crimes, it marked an important recognition of tribal 
sovereignty by a federal institution.  This tribal sovereignty is “inextricably linked” to the safety 
and lives of indigenous women.125  Indigenous women could briefly exhale – the decision provided 
a renewed sense of agency for them to hold abusers accountable under tribal law.    
 
II. CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, 
REAUTHORIZATIONS THEREOF, AND CURRENT LEGISLATION 
 
More recently, Congress has improved its efforts in recognizing and protecting victims of 
violence in Indian Country.  In particular, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2005 (VAWA 2005) first introduced specific provisions directed to the safety of indigenous 
women.126 
 
A. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005) 
 
 The Violence Against Women Act was first signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 
1994 and was subsequently reauthorized in 2000.127  In 2005, Congress prepared another 
reauthorization (VAWA 2005) which contained, for the first time, a title specifically directed to 
the “Safety for Indian Women.”128   
Signed into law by President George W. Bush on January 5, 2006, VAWA 2005 passed 
each of the House and Senate with nearly unanimous support.129  It was the first act of Congress 
explicitly recognizing, and acting in response to, the epidemic of violence faced by Native 
American women.130  In particular, Title IX of VAWA 2005 noted in its findings that “1 out of 
every 3 Indian (including Alaska Native) women are raped in their lifetimes;” that “Indian women 
experience 7 sexual assaults per 1,000, comparted with 4 per 1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per 
1,000 among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000 Asian women;” and that 
“the unique legal relationship of the United States to Indian tribes creates a Federal trust 
responsibility to assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives of women.”131  In fact, 
Congress explicitly provided that the purpose of this new title was “to strengthen the capacity of 
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Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign authority to respond to violent crimes committed against 
women.”132   
Title IX of VAWA 2005 included numerous provisions for the promotion of safety of 
Native American women, such as the authorization for tribal law enforcement agencies to access 
national criminal information databases, increased punishment through federal prosecutions for 
repeat domestic violence offenders who have at least two tribal convictions, and authorization for 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers to arrest, without a warrant, persons reasonably 
believed to have committed certain domestic violence offenses.133  Moreover, it authorized the 
consolidation of VAWA tribal grants to create a single VAWA tribal grant program designed to 
enhance the tribes’ ability to respond to crimes against women and to enhance safety training and 
education.134  This consolidated program allowed tribes to submit a single application for most of 
the tribal grant programs offered by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).  It further 
created a tribal unit in the Office on Violence Against Women and a Deputy Director for Tribal 
Affairs.135  Additionally, VAWA 2005 mandated annual tribal-federal VAWA consultation 
between the DOJ and tribal governments.136 
Despite the acknowledgement that the relationship between the federal government and 
tribal governments was “unique,” and that the federal government has a responsibility for assisting 
tribes, VAWA 2005 did nothing to address the jurisdictional maze created by the decades of 
legislation and judicial decisions that came before it.  That is, VAWA 2005 did not authorize tribal 
courts to exercise their inherent jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for any crime, thus 
maintaining the status quo of Oliphant. Thus, the safety of women in Indian Country was still 
determined by the race, or Indian status, of her abuser.  Should that abuser be a white man, she 
could not rely upon her Nation’s law enforcement or government to protect her.  
 
B. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013) 
 
Thirty-five years after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Oliphant, which remains, 
in relevant part, good law137, Congress took the first steps to restore the “inherent power” of tribal 
courts to exercise criminal jurisdictions via the third reauthorization of the Violence Against 
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Women Act (VAWA 2013).  However, this “inherent power” as provided by VAWA 2013 was 
limited to a specific and enumerated number of situations.138  Significantly, VAWA 2013 was the 
first federal act – by either Congress or the judiciary – that acknowledged and responded to the 
fractured and unworkable jurisdictional maze left in the wake of Oliphant.139 
VAWA 2013, which was signed into law on March 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama, 
granted tribal courts “Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” (SDVCJ) over a limited 
number of crimes, regardless of the race or Indian status of the offender.140  This specialized 
jurisdiction affirmed the inherent sovereign authority of tribal governments to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over certain non-Indians who violate qualifying protection orders or commit domestic 
or dating violence against Indian victims on tribal lands.141  However, the law specifies that a 
participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over a defendant 
only if the defendant (1) resides in the Indian Country of the participating tribe; (2) is employed in 
the Indian Country of the participating tribe; or (3) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner 
of a member of the participating tribe or an Indian who resides in the Indian Country of the 
participating tribe.142  Moreover, as noted by the name, these select defendants could only be tried 
in tribal court if their crime was an incident of domestic violence between romantic or intimate 
partners, only.143  Accordingly, the special jurisdiction does not allow tribal courts to prosecute 
offenders who are strangers or even acquaintances of the victim, and significantly, does not allow 
tribal jurisdiction over crimes such as criminal child abuse, stalking, alcohol and drug use, and 
false imprisonment – crimes that can all frequently arise in settings of domestic violence.144 
The table provided below, adapted from the Tribal Court Clearinghouse and a report by 
the Indian Law and Order Commission, summarizes the current framework of criminal jurisdiction 
of the federal, state and tribal courts over crimes occurring on tribal land, as of the passing of 
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As a result of SDVCJ, Congress restored tribal sovereignty to a small, though meaningful, 
degree.  By the end of 2018, at least twenty-two tribes had implemented this special jurisdiction, 
leading to 143 arrests of 128 non-Indian abusers.146  Of these arrests, seventy-four (about 50%) 
led to convictions, and five (about 3.5%) led to acquittals.147  However, as Jessica Allison aptly 
notes in her analysis of the SDVCJ provisions of VAWA 2013, “the fact that only twenty-two of 
the 573 federally recognized tribes have implemented VAWA 2013 demonstrates that there remain 
barriers to eradicating sexual violence in Indian Country.”148 
One such barrier to the implementation of SDVCJ by the tribal courts is the prohibitive 
expense and need for resources.149  This is not a burden unique to the implementation of this special 
jurisdiction – tribal justice systems have been underfunded for decades.150  As described by the 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe: 
 
In addition to the direct costs of complying with the prerequisites 
(indigent defender systems, jury trials, incarceration, etc.), 
substantial indirect costs are also likely to be required. For example, 
who will review and propose changes to your laws and procedures? 
Who will train law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, court staff and 
defense counsel on the new laws and procedures and how they 
work? What funding will be required to make these changes? To pay 
for any additional prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, and court 
staff? To pay to publish the laws and regulations? To process the 
licensing and educational requirements? To implement the jury 
selection process? To pay for incarceration? Where will these funds 
come from? Is that source of funding stable and reliable?151 
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To minimize these expenses, various tribes have collaborated to create share strategies and 
information about SDVCJ implementation.152  For example, the few tribes that have implemented 
SDVCJ have largely relied on the models and support of fellow tribes, as well as the use of contract 
defense attorneys.153  Although VAWA 2013 authorized $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 
through 2018 for SDVCJ implementation, the Office on Violence of Women (OVW) has awarded 
a total of $5,684,939 in competitive grant funds, allocated amongst fourteen different tribes to 
support their implementation of SDVCJ.154  Ultimately, only four implementing tribes—Tulalip, 
Little Traverse Bay Band, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and Standing Rock—received any 
of these grant funds.155  Yet none of these tribes have used any of these funds to prosecute, likely 
because these funds were exhausted by the mere steps needed to effectively implement the special 
jurisdiction (e.g., training, revising tribal codes, etc.).156 
 
C. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2019 (VAWA 2019) 
 
On April 4, 2019, the United States House of Representatives took another step in 
expanding upon the SDVCJ provided in VAWA 2013, by passing the fourth reauthorization of 
VAWA (VAWA 2019).157  Responding to some of the limitations of VAWA 2013, the 2019 
reauthorization proposes to expand tribal jurisdiction further to include additional violent 
crimes.158  However, VAWA 2019 still significantly and unnecessarily limits the inherent authority 
of the tribes by failing to grant tribal courts jurisdiction over all criminals, regardless of their race 
or that of their victims.  This failure, like all those before it, is rooted in the underlying bias against 
the First Nations and a deep, perhaps unconscious, belief in the inferiority of these Nations and 
their courts as compared to those of the federal government.  As of the writing of this Article, 




The rationale of the decisionmakers at each of the stages of creation of the tribal court 
jurisdictional maze has been rooted in bias against indigenous people and the First Nations.  
Evidence of this bias and disdain for indigenous culture and history has been peppered throughout 
decisions rendered in the highest echelons of our judicial system, and in statements of the most 
advanced legislative body in this country.  But this bias is pervasive.  It is still present in the 
modern-day interactions between tribes and the federal government, in each of the judiciary and 
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the legislature.  Armed with the recognition of this bias, this Article argues for the abrogation of 
the decision rendered in Oliphant as one means of acknowledging and abolishing this bias.  Despite 
the provisions drafted specifically for Indian Country, VAWA 2013 and 2019 have simply not 
gone far enough to restore safety to indigenous women and the First Nations. 
 
A. VAWA 2019 Fails to Sufficiently Protect Indigenous Women 
 
As noted above, the United States House of Representatives passed the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 1585) on April 4, 2019, after a largely party-line vote 
with 230 Democratic and thirty-three Republican representatives voting in favor of the bill.160  
 In relevant part, the bill broadens the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction 
granted to tribal courts by the VAWA 2013 reauthorization and uses a new term to describe this 
expanded jurisdiction: “Special Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction.”  This new jurisdiction amends 
SDVCJ to include jurisdiction over stalking, sex trafficking, sexual violence, domestic violence 
(expanding the definition from VAWA 2013), assault of a law enforcement or correctional officer, 
and obstruction of justice.161  While these expanded authorizations are necessary and will help 
restore some semblance of sovereignty to tribal courts and Indian Country, Congress must pass 
legislation allowing tribal courts to have absolute criminal jurisdiction over their lands and their 
people, without caveats to the types of crimes involved.  That is, Congress must, at the very least, 
statutorily abrogate the Oliphant decision. 
Yet, Congress will never take such action until it recognizes and acknowledges that the 
complex jurisdictional scheme created throughout the history of this country has been built on 
centuries of white bias and prejudice against Native American tribes, citizens, culture, and 
tradition.  In particular, Congress must confront the harmful and dangerous belief that  Native 
Americans lack sufficient competence or authority to govern their own lands, and it must recognize 
the role this belief has played in the restriction of rights and scope of tribal court jurisdiction and 
sovereignty throughout history.  
 
1. Returning to the Historical Context: Acknowledging the White Bias 
 
The expansion of criminal tribal jurisdiction to absolute – or at least nearly absolute – 
jurisdiction over Indian lands would not be unheard of in the history of this country.  In fact, the 
passage of time has only led to the erosion of tribal jurisdiction through various Congressional and 
Supreme Court interferences.  At the time of European discovery – or invasion – of America, tribes 
were, of course, completely sovereign “by nature and necessity,” in that they conducted and 
regulated their own affairs acting independently and without any external power that was required 
 
160 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 156, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Apr. 4, 2019), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2019/roll156.xml [https://wr.perma-archives.org/public/qna2-
5pzg/im_/https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2019/roll156.xml]. 




to legitimize their authority.162  Upon their invasion of the new world, however, the Europeans 
claimed dominion over all territories, seemingly limiting this pre-existing tribal sovereignty, and 
leaving, in many cases, the Supreme Court to resolve the resulting uncertainties.163 
 The Supreme Court has never had a Native American justice in their ranks, let alone a 
justice with any substantial Native American education or knowledge.  In fact, there have only 
been three Native American federal judges in the history of our country: Billy Michael Burrage 
(former chief judge of all three districts of the U.S. District Courts for Oklahoma), Diane Joyce 
Humetewa (current judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona; former judge of 
the Hopi Appellate Court, Keams Canyon, Arizona), and Frank Howell Seay (former chief judge 
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma).164  Similarly, only twenty-two 
Native American individuals have ever served in Congress, and the first ever Native American 
Cabinet secretary, Debra Haaland, was sworn into office under President Joe Biden on March 17, 
2021.165  So, it comes as no surprise that each of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive 
Branch has been a large factor in the creation and perpetuation of the jurisdictional maze dictating 
and limiting a tribal court’s sovereignty over its own lands and people. 
 In the 1800s, Chief Justice Marshall had several opportunities to evaluate the status of 
Indian tribes, and for the most part, recognized the sovereignty of the tribes as separate “states” 
within the country: 
 
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of 
the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society separated from 
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, 
in the opinion of the majority of the judges, been completely 
successful.166 
 
And when faced with the opportunity a year later, Marshall reiterated this status: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time 
immemorial, with the single excepted of that imposed by irresistible 
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other 
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the 
particular region claimed . . . .167 
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Thus, under the Marshall Court, and after the conclusion of the Marshall Trilogy, tribes were 
viewed as sovereign and free from all state intrusion on that sovereignty in all but two ways: (1) 
requirement that tribes can only convey land to the federal government; and (2) lack of ability to 
deal with foreign powers.168 
 Following the Marshall Trilogy, however, the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court 
took a dark turn, which some have argued “memorialize[] the darkest decades for Indian people in 
American history.”169  Specifically, in Crow Dog, the Court held that the federal court had no 
jurisdiction over an Indian man who murdered another Indian man in Indian Country.170  While on 
its face, this outcome aligns with the tribal courts’ desired scope of criminal jurisdiction, the 
rationale the Court used to reach that decision gives crystal clear insight into the explicit bias 
against the competence of the indigenous.  For example, although ultimately holding in favor of 
Indian Country handling its own internal criminal matters, the Court held, in an opinion penned 
by Justice Stanley Matthews and wrought with a profoundly explicit bias: 
 
It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that 
law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the 
members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the 
instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power 
which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and 
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil 
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have 
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by 
others, and not for them, which . . . makes no allowance for their 
inability to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the 
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors 
of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which 
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the 
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest 
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red 
man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.171 
 
Thus, the Court held not in favor of the tribe because it viewed the tribe as a separate state capable 
of handling its own affairs, but rather because it believed that the “savage” tribe of “red men” 
would have been unable to understand the law of the white man.   
 Congress acted swiftly, distraught with the Court’s recognition of tribal sovereignty in 
Crow Dog.  Within two years following the decision, the Major Crimes Act was passed, stripping 
tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over seven distinct crimes committed by Indians in Indian 
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Country, regardless of the race of the victim.  In particular, the original Major Crime Act provided 
that:  
[A]ll Indians, committing against the person or property of another 
Indian or other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder, 
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and 
larceny within any Territory of the United States, and either within 
or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws 
of such Territory relating to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor 
in the same courts and in the same manner and shall be subject to 
the same penalties as are all persons charged with the commission 
of said crimes, respectively; and the said courts are hereby given 
jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such Indians committing any 
of the above crimes against the person or property of another Indian 
or other person within the boundaries of any State of the United 
States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be 
subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same 
manner, and subject to the same penalties as are all other persons 
committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States.172 
 
The legislative history of this act explicitly demonstrates that the legislatures, just like the Court 
in Crow Dog, saw Native Americans as uncivilized savages.  In particular, in the debate to pass 
the Major Crimes Act, quoted above, Rep. Cutcheon of Michigan stated, “I do not believe we shall 
ever succeed in civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for law, and show them that 
they are not only responsible to the law, but amenable to its penalties.”173  Furthermore, during the 
congressional debate, the term “or other person” was added following “another Indian” to ensure 
that all Indians were to be prosecuted in federal court for any of the crimes committed, regardless 
of the race or status of the victim.174  Notably, the bill was passed to provide the federal government 
with concurrent criminal jurisdiction, which it shared with the tribe.  It was not until Oliphant, 
over 150 years later, that criminal tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was judicially removed.175 
 In the Oliphant decision, the Court announced the third limitation176 on tribal sovereignty: 
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with the domestic, 
dependent status of the tribes.177  In rendering this decision, the Court pointed to 200 years of 
federal legislation, which it argued “assum[ed] that Indian tribal courts are without inherent 
jurisdiction to try non-Indians, and must depend on the Federal Government for protection from 
intruders.”178  Therefore, the Court held that, absent any express legislation from Congress 
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permitting tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the courts had no such 
power. 
However, at the time of the decision, tribes had previously been recognized as sovereign 
“domestic dependent nations,” in part by the Marshall Court.  Therefore the relevant inquiry was 
whether the federal government had passed any legislation preventing tribes from acting within its 
inherent sovereignty – not whether the federal government provided any legislation permitting the 
tribes to act.179  Thus, by rendering its decision in Oliphant, the Supreme Court opened the 
dangerous door to the discovery and enforcement of “inherent” limitations on tribal sovereignty, 
the effects of which have reverberated in countless decisions that have come down from the high 
Court in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
For example, as a result of Oliphant, tribes lost the power to regulate liquor sales on tribal 
land and to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within its 
reservations.180  These decisions were based in the Court’s narrow view that the tribes retained 
inherent power only to protect self-government and to control “internal relations” defined as 
including “the power to punish tribal offenders, . . . to determine tribal membership, to regulate 
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”181 
The jurisdictional maze has only gotten more complicated as Congress reacts to decisions 
handed down by the high court.  In 1990, the Supreme Court further narrowed tribal jurisdiction 
by holding that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on their 
reservations – that is, the Court changed course from the pattern of Congressional legislation 
basing criminal jurisdiction on the defendant’s status as an Indian, regardless of the tribe.182  
Congress swiftly overruled the Court by defining tribal powers of self-government to include the 
“exerciser [of] criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”183  However, passing the legislation raised 
the question of whether by acting, Congress had conferred power on to the tribes to punish 
nonmember Indians, or if it had simply recognized an inherent tribal power to assert such criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Based on Congress’s reactionary approach to decisions from the Supreme Court, it remains 
to seen how Congress decides to act in the wake of McGirt v. Oklahoma, which, despite having 
no impact on resolving the jurisdictional maze, provided a glimmer of hope that overcoming the 
bias against the First Nations within our government could be achieved.  However, the decision, 
which expressly granted Congress the sole authority to withdraw the promises it made to the First 
Nations in the 19th century, could have detrimental effects if Congress were to side with the 
Governor of Oklahoma, who asserts that the decision will “disrupt Oklahoma’s criminal justice 
system and free dangerous criminals.”184   
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2. A Hard Look at the Modern Bias Against the First Nations 
 
Although the opinions and debates on the House and Senate floors have lost the explicit 
and blatant disregard for the status of Native Americans as citizens of the United States that were 
once prevalent in those of the 19th and early 20th century, the bias against Native Americans still 
exists in the opinions and actions of the courts and legislature today.  The modern existence of an 
implicit bias185 against Native Americans by the general public of the United States provides 
sufficient evidence in and of itself that the federal government does not view tribal courts as having 
the competence to handle its own internal affairs. 
In 2017, National Public Radio (NPR) conducted a study to evaluate discrimination against 
Native Americans in the United States.186  The study found that Native Americans reported 
discrimination against them in each of the institutional and individual contexts.187  For example, 
about 30% of Native Americans reported they had been discriminated in their employment – e.g., 
when applying for jobs or in their pay – and about the same amount reported they had been they 
discriminated against by the police and/or by the courts.188  The study concluded that, overall, 75% 
of Native Americans believe there is institutional and individual discrimination against indigenous 
people in the U.S. today.189 
This bias is not just recognized by the general Native American population.  It has also 
infiltrated the way state and federal courts view the competence and ability of tribal courts.  
Though the definition of “competence” has advanced significantly since the days of the Burke Act, 
in which the competence of a Native American was determined based on the amount of Indian 
blood they had or didn’t have,190 there have been documented incidents in which tribal courts have 
been subject to that same discrimination. 
In December 2010, tribal judge Claudette White from Southern California attempted to file 
a petition order for a Native women who had been attacked, and whose attacker was still at large.191  
In response to hearing that Native women had been having issues registering issued protection 
orders with the county, Judge White delivered it to the sheriff herself, hoping to ease the process.192  
At this time, VAWA 2013 had not been passed, so when Judge White appeared in front of the 
sheriff deputy, she was told that nothing could be done.193  Judge White immediately contacted a 
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California state judge, Judge Juan Ulloa, and asked him to speak to the officers.  Judge White 
recounts, “As soon as I put him on, their attitudes changed . . . You know, ‘Yes judge, right away, 
judge.’ Completely different from the way they were treating me.”194  Although the tribal courts 
and California state courts soon worked out a system to get protective orders issued by tribal courts 
registered with the sheriff, the system remains imperfect, and undermines the authority of the tribal 
court to have to receive a sign-off from a state court.195  As Judge White acknowledges, “Those 
are all steps that are not required under the law . . . But that’s the end-run we’re required to create 
to protect our members.”196 
Where tribal courts lack jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, for example, in a criminal child 
abuse case, the tribes must request and rely upon FBI intervention.  The FBI, however, has limited 
resources and its agents are often overburdened and located far away from the reservations.  As of 
the end of 2018, the FBI had only 140 special agents and 40 victim specialists assigned to assist in 
cases within Indian Country, which includes over 1,000,000 people.197  Thus, it is unsurprising 
that between the years 2005 and 2009, the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute about 52% 
(or about 4,000 cases) of the violent crimes from Indian Country that were reported to them.198 
 
B. Congress Must Statutorily Abrogate the Oliphant Decision 
 
While the passage of VAWA 2019 would substantially expand the ability of tribal judges 
like Judge White to protect the women of her tribe, it does not go far enough in restoring the full 
extent of inherent tribal sovereignty as it pertains to criminal tribal jurisdiction.  Until such inherent 
authority is restored, tribal courts will always have to jump through hoops to demonstrate and 
effectuate authority and competence.  Restoration of this inherent authority can and must 
necessarily be achieved by the statutory abrogation of the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in 
Oliphant. 
The analysis of the Court in its Oliphant decision expressly abandoned the long-standing 
principles of Indian law.  Prior to Oliphant, the Supreme Court had interpreted the boundaries of 
tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty by relying on clear congressional statements abrogating tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.199  Rather than maintaining the status quo, the Court adopted an 
“unspoken assumption” theory which fatally stripped all tribal courts of all criminal jurisdiction 
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congressional reports, and other questionable evidence in support, the Court concluded that 
because of the “implicit divesture doctrine,”201 tribal courts, in fact, never had jurisdiction over 
non-Indian defendants in the first place.202  Notably, the Oliphant Court stated, at the end of the 
opinion:  
 
We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have become 
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state 
counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the passage of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic 
procedural rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the 
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal courts 
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago 
have disappeared. Finally, we are not unaware of the prevalence of 
non-Indian crime on today's reservations which the tribes forcefully 
argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But these are 
considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian 
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.203 
 
Thus, not only did the Court briefly acknowledge the sophistication of some tribal courts (and 
impliedly, the unsophistication of others – additional evidence of the bias against these courts), 
the Court left open the door to Congress to pass legislation to restore criminal tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. 
 Other than VAWA, Congress has not remained completely silent on the inherent rights of 
tribes.  In 1978, after the Oliphant decision was rendered, Congress passed the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA).204  ICWA was enacted in response to the removal of indigenous children 
from their homes by state child welfare systems and private adoption agencies.205  A 1969 survey 
by the Association of American Indian Affairs found that at least twenty-five percent of all Indian 
children were separated from their families and placed in white, non-Indian homes and boarding 
schools.206  Between 1969 and 1974, that percentage increased to at most thirty-five percent of all 
Indian children.207  In passing ICWA, Congress sought to protect the relationship between Indian 
children and Indian families and custom and to preserve inherent tribal authority: 
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[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for 
the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement 
of such children in foster or adoptive homes with will reflect the 
unique values of Indian culture.208 
 
ICWA has not gone unchallenged.  Most recently the Fifth Circuit upheld ICWA, holding against 
the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana which claimed that protections for Indian children and 
families constituted illegal racial discrimination, and that ICWA’s federally mandated state court 
standards illegally “commandeer” state courts and agencies to carry out a federal scheme.209  
However, after so concluding, the court reheard the case en banc in January 2020.210  As of the 
writing of this Article, the court had not yet rendered its final opinion. 
ICWA and VAWA are but two relatively modern responses to the pervasive prejudice 
against the First Nations that still exist today.  The passage of these legislations has undoubtedly 
benefited Indian culture, but not enough to correct the hardships the government and its agencies 
have bestowed upon them over time.   
Each of these responses fails to acknowledge or address the use of education as a weapon 
forced assimilation of Indian children into Western civilization.211  Schools that were designed by 
the federal government to “inoculate Indian children with the virtues and values of Western 
civilization and to eliminate the traces of Indian cultures.”212  Schools that resorted to corporeal 
punishment of children, imprisoned disobedient students in school jails, cut the traditionally long 
hair of Indian children, and forced instruction in English.213 
Each of these responses fails to acknowledge the mysterious and forced sterilization of 
approximately 25% of Indian women of child-bearing age beginning in 1962.214  Women who 
signed consent forms to undergo emergency Caesarian-section deliveries, only to later discover 
they had also consented to tubal ligations or hysterectomies.215  Or women who only consented to 
such procedures out of fear of losing welfare benefits.216  Or even women who consented to such 
procedures after being convinced they were unfit mothers.217 
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In the forty-two years that have passed since Oliphant, violence against indigenous women 
has only gotten worse.  While Senate approval of VAWA 2019 will fill some of the gaps left in 
the wake of VAWA 2013, such as providing the ability for tribal courts to prosecute mere 
acquaintances or even strangers who commit violent crimes against Native women – which 
constitutes the vast majority of sexual assault cases – it does not go far enough to recognize and 
resolve the systemic biases that have limited tribal jurisdiction and doubted tribal competence since 




Abrogating the Oliphant decision would not come without challenges, but would be a 
significant first step in acknowledging white bias and entrusting the First Nations with the 
authority they are owed.  Restoring criminal tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians could have both 
advantageous and disadvantageous impacts on the law and order of Indian Country, and more 
specifically, on indigenous women.  It would undoubtedly face backlash upon reaching the Senate 
floor, particularly with respect to the due process of the non-Indian defendant.  Though this change 
would have broad implications regarding the tribal court system and the tribal-federal relationship, 
abandoning the principles of the Oliphant decision is necessary to properly confront the modern 
manifestations of white supremacy that continue to oppress indigenous peoples. 
 
A. Impact on Indigenous Women 
 
First and foremost, the abrogation of Oliphant would allow more indigenous women to 
have their day in court and to see the perpetrators of their harm finally brought to justice.  In 
addition to these basic moral and ethical advantages of restoring criminal tribal authority over non-
Indian defendants, the abrogation of Oliphant would improve the socioeconomic effects associated 
with the current justice system. 
Native American reservations often reside in remote areas of vast, sprawling states.  Take 
for instance the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, which sits at the eastern edge of the Rocky 
Mountains in northwest Montana.218  Travel to the local tribal court from the reservation amounts 
to about 1.5 miles.219  In contrast, the closest federal court is 127 miles from the reservation – more 
than a 2-hour drive away. 220  Fort Peck, home to two separate First Nations – the Assiniboine and 
Sioux Tribes – is similarly situated in Montana and requires at least a 9-hour round trip drive in 
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good weather.221  These situations are not rare, impacting indigenous women from Montana to 
Wyoming to Arizona, in reservations both large – like Blackfeet – and small – like Fort Peck. 
These distances can have drastic effect on victims of violent crimes who wish to see their 
abusers brought to justice.  On top of emotional invasion of their mind and bodies, these women 
must also bear the financial costs of traveling long distances – including fuel, lodging, food, and 
the like – in order to see their day in court.222  While some FBI programs exist to provide some 
compensation or transportation to witnesses and victims from reservations to federal court, these 
resources are stretched thin.223  “Taking a trip to Billings or Great Falls is not something you just 
do,” explained Fawn Williamson, a victim-and-witness specialist on the Fort Belknap reservation 
in Montana.224  When a U.S. attorney requested her to appear in court with the defendant on a 
Tuesday, following a subpoena issued the previous Friday, she had to decline due to the time 
commitment and financial burden imposed.225 
By restoring criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants to the tribal courts, not only 
will those Native Americans involved in the trial (e.g., petitioners, witnesses, jurors, etc.) have 
easier access to the court, but so would any Native American involved in any crime occurring in 
Indian Country.  The beneficial effects of the proposed resolution go beyond just crimes against 
women and extend to all crimes committed against any individual.   
While some may argue that in some cases the particular federal court is more accessible 
than the tribal court, the proposed resolution (i.e. the abrogation of Oliphant) is not to restore 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction to the tribal courts.  Rather, the federal and tribal courts would have 
concurrent jurisdiction over these cases.  Therefore, in the 52% of cases where the federal 
government declines to prosecute these non-Indian defendants, the tribal court would be able to 
step in and provide victims with means to justice.226 
 
B. Impact on Non-Indian Defendants 
 
In the debates on the House floor, the largest opposition to the amendments passed by 
VAWA 2019 are those relating to the “due process concerns” of the non-Indian defendant.227  
Although the VAWA 2019 opposition did not elaborate on these concerns, it is likely that these 
concerns draw parallels to those concerns raised during the debates on VAWA 2013 and the 
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adhere to constitutional protections granted to defendants, such as trial by a jury of your peers.  
That is, at the time of the 2013 passage, the opposition appeared to be concerned with the jury 
being composed of all Native American individuals. 
This argument is wrongfully wrought with the bias discussed at length in this Article 
against Native American people.  It necessarily assumes the fact that a Native American juror 
would not be able to be an impartial and objective observer.  Moreover, it ignores the fact that non-
Native American people live on reservations.  Advocates of VAWA 2013 argued as such, and 
noted that tribal juries are not racially homogenous.228  Notably, the passage of VAWA 2013 was, 
in part, contingent on the tribal courts honoring the constitutionally required protections for 
defendants.229   
 
C. Impact on Tribal Court System and Tribal-Federal Relations 
 
The implementation of the restoration of criminal jurisdiction to the tribal courts would 
undoubtedly have benefits, but could also induce hardships – at least initially – on tribal courts.  
Among the most obvious benefits would be that the authority and competence of tribal judges, like 
Judge White, would no longer be systemically undermined by any requirement to have state or 
federal oversight of their actions.230  Tribal court systems would be free to file orders and render 
decisions in criminal suits without the worry of that action not being recognized as binding, and 
without the competence of the judge – or the entire system – being called into question.  That is, 
the abrogation of Oliphant would necessarily require Congress to at least implicitly acknowledge 
the bias against tribal court systems. 
However, implementing this change may bear a substantial financial burden on the tribal 
courts – particularly the courts of smaller Nations with less robust judiciaries.  Like the SDVCJ 
provisions, implementation of a broader statutory scheme will be expensive, and will require 
funding, access to resources, support, and services to assist in the effective implementation.  Tribal 
courts, which have been operating under limited jurisdiction for over forty years, may be 
understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with an influx of new dockets and investigations. 
Thus, in making this statutory change, Congress will need to allocate funds to the tribal 
court systems, as it did with SDVCJ, to help ease these changes.  But as the bearer of the funds, 
Congress will undoubtedly maintain oversight into the distribution and allocation of the assistance, 
which makes ample room for the bias to remain.  There are currently 574 federally recognized 
tribes in the United States.231  This number is not wholly inclusive of all tribes present in the United 
States, such as the majority of Alaska Native tribes and Native Hawaiian tribes, the latter of which 
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are ineligible for federal recognition.232  The receipt of federal assistance and access to federal 
services is contingent on a tribe’s recognition by the federal government, and in order to secure 
federal recognition, a tribe must accede to some level of federal oversight and control.233  The 
current federal recognition process is “badly broken” and in some cases, has taken over 30 years 
to consider a tribe’s application.234  Further, the already limited federal funding allocated to 
recognized tribes, in combination with prosperity in gaming on some reservations, has encouraged 
some tribes to remove individual members from the tribes in a process known as disenrollment: 
“The logic is simple: Reducing the number of tribal members means more money for those who 
remain.”235  In some smaller tribes with affluent gaming profits, monthly payments of $15,000 or 
more are made to members.236 
Tribal disenrollment presents an interesting obstacle for those arguing in favor of full tribal 
sovereignty, in which the tribes would be free of incursion from the federal government.  That is, 
to enforce full tribal sovereignty would be to permit tribes to engage in disenrollment as a function 
of its internal civil jurisprudence.  Tribes could legally strip its members of their Indian identity 
and access to tribal resources, such as health care and educational grants.237  In cases where 
members are receiving substantial monthly payments from the tribe, the effects of disenrollment 
are upending. 
The federal government’s oversight of tribal disenrollment has not always been constant.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government asserted authority and control over tribal 
disenrollment practices.238  However, in 2010, the government assumed a hands-off approach, 
citing to the inherent authority of the tribes.239  This approach resulted in rampant disenrollment 
of members until about 2016, when many tribes ended the practice and reinstated disenrolled 
members.240  Nevertheless, tribes still engage in this process, to the detriment of many individuals, 
and critics have noticed that the rise and fall of disenrollment is closely tied to the federal 
government’s behavior toward the practice. 
Full tribal sovereignty – and thus full abolishment of white bias against tribes – may not 
be reasonably achievable within the current, modern tribal-federal relationship.  There will always 
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be nuances and individual considerations.  As no two Nations are alike, the tribal, state, and federal 
courts and legislatures must work together to create schemes that are sustainable within each 
reservation, state, and region.  While these schemes are developed, Congress must act to abrogate 
Oliphant in order to take a first step in restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction and safety to First 
Nations.  The outcome will be worth it.  As noted by Professor Sarah Deer, “There’s really no 
excuse for [Congress refusing to eliminate the jurisdictional maze] in this day and age to have 




The judicial and legislative history of the United States has gradually and continuously 
assaulted the rights and inherent authority of Native Americans to govern and regulate their own 
lands.  Although fueled by the desire to maintain independent and separate control, rather than 
respect for customs and traditions, the initial treaties made between the Native Americans and the 
European colonizers recognized and granted this inherent authority to the tribes.  Ever since, 
numerous Supreme Court decisions and reactive legislative decisions, shaped and evident of bias 
against the Native American people, have stripped the tribes of any semblance of control over their 
lands. 
Violence against Native American women is unprecedented, and oftentimes committed by 
non-Indian offenders, who are well aware that little to nothing will be done to hold them 
accountable.  By stripping tribal courts of jurisdiction over these defendants, the Supreme Court 
in Oliphant turned a blind eye to the inherent authority of Indian Country and invoked more power 
in the federal court, who more often than not declines to prosecute these cases.  The system is 
fractured. 
The first step in restoring authority to tribal courts is to recognize and wholeheartedly 
acknowledge the bias and prejudice that has been the fuel to the assault on tribal jurisdiction, since 
as early as 1883.242  Once Congress can accept the fact that the assault on Native Americans has 
included both legislative and judicial assaults, just as much as it has been a violent or sexual assault 
against Native American women, it can take the first steps to repair these harms.  Statutorily 
abrogating the Oliphant decision will restore law and order to Indian Country and will allow Native 
American victims of violence to have greater access, power, and ability to see their abusers brought 
to justice. 
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